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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HUGH J. HATCH and ARDEAN HATCH, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
STEPHEN ADAMS, SARAH ADAMS and 
EARL ADAMS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8644 
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING, AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellants, Hugh J. Hatch and Ardean Hatch, petition 
the Court for a rehearing in this case upon the grounds herein-
after set forth. 
In support of said Petition, appellants rely upon the fol-
lowing points: 
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POINT I 
THE WORD "APPURTENANT" IS NOT SUFFICIENT-
LY CERTAIN IN MEANING THAT THE INTENT OF 
THE PARTIES CAN BE ASCERTAINED BY ITS USAGE, 
AND THEREFORE, THE COURT ERRED IN NOTRE-
MANDING THE CASE FOR A NEW TRIAL AND DI-
RECTING THE TRIAL COURT TO ADMIT EVIDENCE 
TO DETERMINE WHAT WATER THE PARTIES IN-
TENDED TO TRANSFER WHEN THEY USED THE TERM 
"APPURTENANT WATER" IN THE CONTRACT. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE A DECISION 
OR FINDING BASED ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AS 
TO THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AND IT WAS 
ERROR FOR THIS COURT TO INCLUDE SUCH EVI-
DENCE IN ITS DECISION AND TO PASS UPON THE 
QUESTION OF INTENT. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT INCORRECTLY 
UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSUMPTION THAT 
THE QUESTION OF APPURTENANCY WAS THE SOLE 
ISSUE IN THE ACTION WHEREAS THE INTENT OF 
THE PARTIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE DETERMIN-
ING ISSUE. 
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WHEREFORE, appellants pray that their petition for 
rehearing be granted and that upon such rehearing, and after 
consideration of the record, and the law, the decision of the 
Court be recalled, and the case remanded to the trial court 
for trial. 
RALPH & BUSHNELL 
By Elwood A. Crandall 
Attorneys for Appellants 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE WORD "APPURTENANT" IS NOT SUFFICIENT-
LY CERTAIN IN MEANING THAT THE INTENT OF 
THE PARTIES CAN BE ASCERTAINED BY ITS USAGE, 
AND THEREFORE, THE COURT ERRED IN NOTRE-
MANDING THE CASE FOR A NEW TRIAL AND DI-
RECTING THE TRIAL COURT TO ADMIT EVIDENCE 
TO DETERMINE WHAT WATER THE PARTIES IN-
TENDED TO TRANSFER WHEN THEY USED THE TERM 
"APPURTENANT WATER" IN THE CONTRACT. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE A DECISION 
OR FINDING BASED ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AS 
TO THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AND IT WAS 
ERROR FOR THIS COURT TO INCLUDE SUCH EVI-
DENCE IN ITS DECISION AND TO PASS UPON THE 
QUESTION OF INTENT. 
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POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT INCORRECTLY 
UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSUMPTION THAT 
THE QUESTION OF APPURTENANCY WAS THE SOLE 
ISSUE IN THE ACTION WHEREAS THE INTENT OF 
THE PARTIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE DETERMIN-
ING ISSUE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WORD "APPURTENANT" IS NOT SUFFICIENT-
LY CERTAIN IN MEANING THAT THE INTENT OF 
THE PARTIES CAN BE ASCERTAINED BY ITS USAGE, 
AND THEREFORE, THE COURT ERRED IN NOTRE-
MANDING THE CASE FOR A NEW TRIAL AND DI-
RECTING THE TRIAL COURT TO ADMIT EVIDENCE 
TO DETERMINE WHAT WATER THE PARTIES IN-
TENDED TO TRANSFER WHEN THEY USED THE TERM 
"APPURTENANT WATER" IN THE CONTRACT. 
Inasmuch as the contract which transferred the farm land 
from the respondents to the appellants indicated that the land 
would be transferred with all water rights appurtenant thereto, 
and inasmuch as no further mention was made in the contract 
of the exact water that was considered by the parties to be 
appurtenant, the appellants attempted to introduce evidence 
in the trial to show what was meant by the terms (T-4, 5). 
This evidence was not introduced to vary the terms of the con-
tract, but to explain them. Counsel for the respondents objected 
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to the introduction of the proffered evidence on the ground 
that it was within the parol evidence rule, and the trial court, 
in its minute entry, sustained the defendant's objection on the 
ground that the evidence violated the parol evidence rule and 
that the contract was not ambiguous (R. 31.) In so doing the 
trial court committed prejudical error, and this error was not 
recognized in the decisoin of this court. Such holdings are 
error for the reason that the evidence offered did not vary the 
instrument but rather explained it, and therefore was not in 
violation of the parol evidence rule. 
The following is the universal rule: 
The parol evidence rule does not preclude the ad-
mission of parol or extrinsic evidence for the purpose 
of aiding in the interpretation or construction of a writ-
ten instrument where the language of the instrument 
itself, taken alone, is such that it does not clearly ex-
press the intention of the parties or the subject of the 
agreement. Such evidence is admitted not to add or to 
detract from the writing but merely to ascertain what 
the meaning of the parties is ... 32 C.J.S. Evidence 
Sec. 959. (Italics added.) 
The word "appurtenant" is not certain in its meaning. 
Even the courts have applied interpretations to the word which 
vary from meaning only those things indispensable to the use 
of land (Ogden v. Jones, 37 S.W. 2nd 777) to simply those 
things which serve some useful purpose to the land (Nixon 
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 14 Ohio App. 472). If 
the courts are undecided as to the exact meaning of the word, 
can it be expected that the true intent of laymen can be de-
termined if the word alone is the only evidence of their in-
tention? 
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The following quotation from McCormick on Evidence, 
Sec. 217, throws light on this somewhat hazy area of the law: 
(See authority cited thereafter in the treatise.) 
... written instruments are not self-sufficient and 
automatic mandates which the courts can always enforce 
merely by inspecting the instrument and stamping it 
with a judicial fiat. Written words can be translated 
into appropriate action by the court only through the 
process of ascertaining what the words stand for in 
the way of particular conduct or particular tangible 
objects. This process of interpretation is one which 
every human expression is subjected to wherever it is 
sought later to be used by human beings as a measure 
of conduct . . . this process is often unnoticed and fre-
quently simple, but often again the meaning of the 
writing is a contested question between the parties, 
and evidence is adduced to solve the issue. The distinc-
tion between such interpretative evidence even where 
it consists of expressions of the parties to the instru-
ment, and evidence of such expressions when offered 
to be used as a part of the contract, deed or otlier trans-
action, and hence prohibited by the Parol Evidence 
Rule, is clear. The one type of evidence concedes the 
supremacy of the writing and merely seeks to illumi-
nate its meaning. Evidence of the prior statements, 
negotiations, and agreements of the parties, offered 
strictly for the purpose of interpretation, may be ex-
cluded under (other) restt·ictions . . . , but such evi-
dence is not within the prohibition of the Parol Et'i-
dence Rule. (Italics added.) 
The admission of parol evidence for the purpose of estab-
lishing what were the circumstances under which the contract 
was made, what was the relation of the parties, and what was 
their mutual knowledge, is not an infringement of the rule 
that parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict, add to, or 
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vary a contract in writing. Olsson v. Nelson, 248 Ala. 28 So. 
2nd 186. 
Where language of a contract is uncertain, extrinsic evi-
dence as to circumstances which preceded and surrounded the 
execution of the contract is admissible and when such evidence 
has been received, the question of the meaning of the language 
used is one of fact. Silva v. Meyer, 276 P 2nd 174, see also 
Cordas v. Wright, 277 P 2nd 520. 
The intention of the parties control 111 the construction 
of deeds. 16 Am. Jur. 527. 
That the intention of the grantor governs in conveyances 
transferring appurtenant water is clear. In the case of James 
v. Barker et al, Colo., 1937, 64 P 2nd 598, where an almost 
identical fact situation existed, a deed purported to convey 
some water rights with the usual "together with all and singular 
the privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging'' clause, 
the court held: 
A water right used, as here, for the irrigation of land, 
will pass under the appurtenance clause in a convey-
ance of land, without a specific mention in the deed, if 
the presumptions arising from the circumstances of 
the transaction make it appear that it was the intention 
of the grantor that it should so pass. 
In order to determine the circumstances of the transaction 
and the intention of the grantor, it is necessary to introduce 
evidence of the exact nature as that which the appellants 
attempted to introduce in the trial court. The decision of this 
court should remand the action for a new trial with instructions 
to admit extrinsic evidence as to the intent of the parties. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE A DECISION 
OR FINDING BASED ON EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AS 
TO THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES, AND IT WAS 
ERROR FOR THIS COURT TO INCLUDE SUCH EVI-
DENCE IN ITS DECISION AND TO PASS UPON THE 
QUESTION OF INTENT. 
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike 
parol evidence offered to corroborate and explain the intent 
of the parties as shown by the contract. Inconsistently thereafter 
the court then proceeded to make Findings of Fact as to 
whether the water was appurtenant and the intent of the parties. 
In so doing, it relied upon extrinsic and parol evidence which 
it had purportedly stricken from the record. The Supreme Court 
in affirming the judgment of the trial court has made the same 
error. It has by implication upheld the ruling of the trial 
court in striking the parol evidence. Then it proceeds to examine 
the evidence in support of the trial court's determination and 
concludes "There can be no doubt that there is substantial 
evidence to support the trial court's findings." It is the position 
of the appellants that the lower court, having stricken the parol 
evidence, ruled as a matter of law that the water did not pass 
pursuant to the contract as being appurtenant to the land since 
the water rights were represented by stock certificates. Reliance 
thereafter by the trial court and by the Supreme Court on parol 
evidence introduced by the defendants, more particularly, the 
escrow agreement and the letter to Mr. Adams, cannot be 
consistently explained. All the plaintiffs request from this court 
is a ruling to the effect that parol and extrinsic evidence may 
10 
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be received to determine the intent of the parties and that a 
new trial be granted, at which time all of such evidence will 
be considered by the trier of the facts. 
The decision cited parol evidence m the favor of the 
respondents to indicate the intent of the parties when in the 
trial court, as the fact finder, lies the sole determination of the 
issue of intent. 
The trial court did not make a finding as to the intent of 
the parties, and therefore, that issue is not before the appellate 
court. By affirming the trial court this court must adhere to 
the view that extrinsic evidence as to intent is inadmissible. 
It was improper therefore to assume the position and at the 
same time cite such evidence in the opinion. 
It is true that such evidence as cited was admitted in the 
trial court without objection from the appellants, but the ap-
pellants, in order to remain consistent with their view of the 
law, could not object to such evidence and at the same time 
allege that all such extrinsic evidence was admissible to clarify 
the intent of the contracting parties. This dilemma should not 
be used against the appellants in derogation of their rights. 
It is submitted that the escrow agreement and the letter which 
were referred to in the decision should stand in the same light 
as evidence which the appellants attempted unsuccessfully to 
introduce. All such evidence should be placed before the trial 
court for a decision of fact, but no part of this type of evidence 
should be considered by either the trial or appellate court 
without considering all like evidence. 
11 
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POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT INCORRECTLY 
UPHELD THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSUMPTION THAT 
THE QUESTION OF APPURTENANCY WAS THE SOLE 
ISSUE IN THE ACTION WHEREAS THE INTENT OF 
THE PARTIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE DETERMIN-
ING ISSUE. 
According to the respondents the sole purpose of this 
action was to determine whether the water represented by the 
stock in question was appurtenant to the land which was sold 
under the contract. Quoting from their brief at page 2: 
It should be remembered that the case went to trial 
on this one issue only. This is not a case brought to 
reform a contract. Nor is it a case brought upon a 
theory of fraud or mistake in reducing the agreement 
to writing. 
Though we agree that the issues were not couched in terms 
of reformation, fraud or mistake, we cannot agree that the sole 
question presented by the pleadings was the question of ap-
purtenancy. Rather, the issue before the trial court was what 
effect should be given the contract of the parties. Paragraph 4 
of the appellant's complaint reads as follows: 
4. The Plaintiffs are entitled by the terms of the above 
mentioned contract to have transferred to them the 
water rights represented by said certificates. 
Throughout this action, the appellants have based their rights 
on the contractual intent of the parties as evidenced by the 
written instrument and as clarified by extrinsic evidence. 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In its decision this Court, in construing Brimm v. Cache 
Valley Banking Company, 2 U 2nd 93, 269 P 2nd 859, held 
that for water represented by stock to pass in a conveyance, 
it must be found first that the water was in fact appurtenant to 
the land, and second, that it was the intent of the grantor to 
transfer the water with the land. 
The decision states: "There was substantial conflict in the 
evidence as to the extent and use of the water on this land.'' 
It is submitted that there was no conflict in the evidence in 
this regard. Rather, the water had been used in connection 
with this farm for almost one-half century. There was no con-
tention by any parties but what the water was purchased with 
the farm by the respondents and used by them on the farm until 
the time of sale, and thereafter was used by the appellants 
for approximately two years before this dispute arose. The 
case was not tried on the question of whether the water was 
appurtenant but rather, whether it had been included in the 
contract. 
We respectfully submit that water rights in the State of 
Utah are transferred almost daily by the passing of shares of 
stock when the water is not appurtenant to any land and in 
fact when a transfer of real estate is not part of the same ex-
change. In effect this decision of the court holds that, since the 
Brimm case, in order for there to be a valid transfer of water 
rights, the grantor must not only intend to transfer the water, 
but also the water must be appurtenant to the land. It is the 
view of the appellants that even if the water in question was 
not appurtenant it may be transferred if such was the intent 
of the parties. 
13 
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In this case a specific mention of water rights was made 
in the contract. The Brimm case dealt with a situation where 
no mention of water was made in the deed. Where there is 
no mention of water rights in the document of transfer, in 
order for the water rights to pass with the land it is necessary 
to find that it is appurtenant. This doctrine is based upon the 
proposition that where water rights are so completely identified 
with certain property, they are deemed to be an incident of 
that property and will pass without specific mention in the 
deed. The Brimm case had one other requirement. In addition 
to being appurtenant, if the water rights are represented by 
stock certificates, then it must be shown that it was the intent 
of the parties that these rights should also pass with the land. 
So even under the Brimm case, the matter of intent was im-
portant and was emphasized by the court. Since the word 
"appurtenant" has no uniform technical meaning, it therefore 
becomes necessary to look at all of the evidence and the sur-
rounding circumstances to determine the intent of the parties. 
In "In re Johnson's Estate," 64 Utah 114, 728 Pacific, the court 
stated: 
. 
In such a case (where water rights are separated 
from the land) if the water right is represented by 
shares of stock in a corporation, the plain implication 
is that it may be transferred by a transfer of the cer-
tificate of stock, in the ordinafy manne1', as personal 
property. But that does not necessarily mean that water 
rights thus represented may not be an appurtenant to 
the land upon which the water is used, and pass as such 
with a conveyance of the land. (Italics added.) 
It is the contention of the appellants that even if the water 
in question was not appurtenant in the strict sense of the word, 
14 
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the appellants should be allowed their right to prove, if they 
can, that by using the word "appurtenant" it was the intent 
of the parties to the contract to include the water in question 
in the conveyance, and that upon establishing this the water 
would be transferred. The case should be remanded for a new 
trial for a determination of this issue which was not made by 
the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Brimm case holds that where water rights are repre-
sented by stock certificates, a rebuttable presumption is created. 
The transferee, to rebut the presumption created by statute, 
may introduce evidence to show that the water was in fact 
appurtenant and that the parties intended that the water rights 
were to be included as an incident of the property. If extrinsic 
and parol evidence is not permitted, how then may the pre-
sumption be rebutted? 
In this case the decision as written holds that where the 
transferee acquired the property pursuant to a contract, which 
stated "all water rights appurtenant thereto" may not introduce 
extrinsic or parol evidence to show what was meant by the 
word "appurtenant" or the intent of the parties. Such a holding 
places the transferee in a worse position by reason of having 
such a statement in the contract that he would have been if 
he had only received a deed of conveyance. To be consistent, 
parol and extrinsic evidence should be admissible to show 
that the water was in fact appurtenant and the intent of the 
parites in either case. The statement in the contract is merely 
evidence concerning the intent of the parties and should not 
15 
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be used to prohibit introduction of evidence on the two issues 
mentioned above. For these reasons the case should be remanded 
to the trial court for a new trial to determine the rights of the 
parties after due consideration of all the facts surrounding the 
transaction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RALPH & BUSHNELL 
By Elwood A. Crandall 
Attorneys for Appellants 
15 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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